Abstract -This paper illustrates the developrrent ard analysis of a group of transmission system nodels which include both corn mode failures and adverse weather conditions. Both of these factors have been considered as separate phencxrenon in previously developed nodels and as such have been subjected to individual and independent analysis. The nodels illustrated in this paper are used to examine the sensitivity of selected reliability indices to individual paraneter variation in the composite model.
INTRODUCrICN
There has been a considerable increase in the past few years in the developrrent of modellng techniques and data collection for pcwer system and subsystem reliability evaluation. The area of transmission system reliability evaluation has historically been sonewhat slower to develop than that of generation systems in both mndelling techniques and data collecticn. Recent research funding, however, should provide considerable inpetus to this development. The creation of nodels and the examination and julstification of associated data are a joint and highly interrelated activity. The techniques in use at the present tine for distribution and transmission system studies were initiated in 1964 (1) and expanded and advanced in subsequent publications (2) .
These papers developed nodels and equations for series and parallel system considerations which in addition to proposing indices of failure rate, average outage tine and average amnual outage time included consideration of failure bunching due to adverse weather conditions. This is an inportant phenonenon particularly in distribution system networks. It does, however, pose considerable difficulty in regard to data collection. It is relatively siniple to determine if a failure occurs during adverse weather. It is not so sinrple, however, to detemine appropriate data for the incidence and duration of the adverse weather when failures do not occur. Ihe additional prcblem of the lack of data regarding distribution system comrponent populations has resulted in very little data being made available on ccuxponent normal and adverse weather failure rates. Failure bunching of parallel facilities due to adverse weather is son-etines mistakenly considered as a ccirron node or ccamn cause outage. This is not true in regard to the nudels presently available(1,2), although conuon mode outages can certainly occur in adverse weather. A conmron mnde outage is a situation in which multiple outages occur due to a single event where these outages are not consequences of each other. This phencrrenon has been examined in several recent publications, (3, 4, 5) where it was shown that the recognition of the phenorenon can significantly effect predicted reliability indices. In the case of adverse weather Paper A80 080-2, recommended and approved by the nodelling as conducted in Peferences 1 and 2 the conrimn factor is the environnent in which the multiple ccmponents find themselves. The actual failures are then assuned to be independent events occuring with enhanced failure rates due to the ccorrnon adverse weather environrent. This paper briefly summarizes and places in focus the existing nodels and equations for considering adverse weather effects and also conrron node outages. It then proposes and exanines a possible model for including both phencxnon simultaneously. The sensitivity of the calculated reliability indices to selected parameters is examined and illustrated in detail.
Equations are developed to permit relatively easy utilization of the nodel in distribution and transmission system reliability studies.
ADVERSE WEATHER CCNSIDERATIONS
The basic approach to adverse weather rodelling assurs that the fluctuating environent associated with an outdoor ccoiponent such as a transmission line can be reduced to a two or three state model. The mnst coumon representation is the two state nodel described by normal and adverse weather. The (1) In the case of a sinple radial or series system, the load point failure rate is Xav and recognition of X and X' as separate entities is not required in the reliability nodel. In the case of a two corponent redundant supply, the conventional formla for the load point failure rate XL is:
Xav2 (r1 + r2) (2) This predicted value can prove to be extrerrely optimistic if the two conponent configuration can exist in a joint adverse weather environrent. This effect is shown in Table 1 for a two and three canponent redundant configuration. The effect of varying the actual percentage of corponent failures which occur during adverse weather is also illustrated. The Error Factor shown in Table 1 is obtained by expressing the calculated load point failure rate including adverse weather effects in per unit of the predicted value obtained using Equation (2) . The system failure rates shown in Table 1 were obtained using the equations given in Reference 2 and for the case in which no repair is performed during the adverse weather period. The Error Factor for two, three and four elen-ent fully redundant configurations with and without repair activity during the adverse weather periods are shown in Figure  1 . Similar curves are shcwn in Reference 5. Adverse weather effects have also been examined using Markov nodels (5). Figure 6 is a direct extension of the model in Figure 3 while Figure 7 relates to Figure 4 . There are many possible variations of those nodels as discussed earlier in connection with the ccmmon node phencu enon The variations in the probability of being in the two line out state as a function of the relative magnitude of the comron cause failure rate Xc is shown in Figure  8 . The results shown in Figure-8 are very similar to those in Figure 5 . Ihe ccnron caiuse failure phencuenon has a dcninant influence cn the system failure probability. This influence is considerably greater than the coron environrent phenceon created by adverse weather during which independent failures occur. This is an Correspond to Moldel of Figure 7 Correspond to Model of Results using these equations are shown in Table II together with theoretically "exact" results obtained using a Markov approach. IThe procedure in this case is illustrated in Peference 5. The stochastic transitional probability matrix P for the state space nodel of Figure   6 can be easily fored. The systen nean tine to failure can be cbtained by considering states 4 and 8 in Figure 6 as absorbing states. The truncated Q matrix is forned by deleting states 4 and 8. Figure 4 , the average systen outage tine is therefore very close to the tine required to repair a ccamon node failure.
It is cbvious therefore that not only nust appropriate data be used but the nodel selected must also be physi- Table III is obtained by assuming no repair during adverse weather and 50% of the coron nude outages occuring in adverse weather. An approximate formula for the system average outage tin-e for the model of Figure 6 with no repair during adverse weather is as follows.
If the contribution to the systen failure rate due to normal weather failures (nodes 1, 2 and 3) and adverse weather failures (nodes 4, 5 and 6) are given by Aen and Aes respectively, then the average outage duration is equal to the sum of the average outage duration is equal to the sum of the weighed duration associated with each of these outage rate values i.e., Figure 10 shows that the error in this case is relatively small and in view of the difficulties associated with collecting and utilizing adverse weather data may be negligible. The statement tlhat "it may be possible to neglect the fluctuating environnent" includes both corruon cause outages and independent outages during adverse weather.
Preliminary data appears to indicate that the percentage of ccmrion mrode outages which occur on transmission lines during adverse weather may be much higher than the 50% figure used in the results shown in Figure 10 . This may not be the case however if the grouped terminal effects are included in the ccxnposite line models. Figure 10 shows the Error Factors for the conditicns used in Figure 12 but with the percentaae of conmon mode outages occurring during adverse weather varied fram 0 to 100%. The effect is minimal in these cases and indicates that the use of an overall annual common nude outage rate rather than two separate and quite distinct weather related rates may give acceptable Figure 1 in which comrrron results. This is an inportant point as noted in the Introduction to this paper. Calculation of adverseweather failure rates for both conon cause and independent events requires a detailed knowledge of the environment for those situations in which failures did occur and also failures did not occur. Overall amnual failure rates for both common node and independent events are much easier to obtain than weather related rates. Figure 12 shows that variation in the Error Factor for two, three, four and five line redundant configurations as a function of the percentage of line failures occurring during adverse weather. Ihe two and three line cases are the nost inportant as carplete redundancy is not normally provided in four and five line configuration. TIhe ordinate scales are reversed for the two line and the three, four and five line configurations. The line failure rate is 0.5 f/yr with r = 2.5 hours Xc = 0.05 f/yr, 50% of the cannon cause failures occurring during adverse weather and no repair during adverse weather.
CCUCLUSIONS
Systen reliability predictions in redundant transmission and distribution configurations are normally done assuming that ccrponent failures are independent events. A comparison of actual system performance and the calculated indices often indicate that the predictions are quite optimistic and therefore the nodels are not physically canpatible with the actual situation.
TIhe development of a two state weather nodel was an attempt to recognize the variable stress level inposed upon outdoor camponents. It assumed dependence in regard to the environment in which the omponents exist and therefore dependence in regard to the stress related failure rates but also assuned independence between actual component failure events. This point is not clearly understood in many of the discussions taking place in industry and research organizations. This has becae more evident with the increased attention paid to carn node outage events. These events can physically occur in both normal and non-normal weather but multiple failures during non-normal weather are not autantically canon node or common cause events. Table IV. 10 X = E (Failure rate).
Data collection in transmission and
The average outage duration is given by: 1 rSL = "+213+P 3908 Discussion R. Sahu (American Electric Power Service Corp., New York, NY): The paper has presented an interesting method for combining adverse weather conditions and common mode failures into system failure rate calculations. The conclusion, that common mode outages are more significant than weather-related effects would be of interest to transmission line planners.
The authors have pointed out that collection of data for models proposed may not be practical or feasible. There is indeed, a lot of difficulty to collect weather-related data; because a judgment has to be made as to which of the failures occurred in fair-weather and adverseweather respectively. This is likely to introduce considerable error in data even if it were feasible to collect the same. Also, difficulty is anticipated in estimating the percentage of time adverse weather would occur.
Perhaps these could be overcome by segregating failure data on seasonal basis; for example: June to August and December to February. The former corresponds to lightning season and summer peak load period; the latter corresponds to snow and ice storm season, and winter peak load period. J. Endrenyi (Ontario Hydro, Toronto, Canada): The authors are to be complimented for providing new insight into aspects of transmission line modeling, and for their discussion of the relative importance of common-mode failures and adverse-weather effects. Some of the graphs and tabulations in the paper are particularly revealing. I would, however, appreciate a follow-up on the remarks that "it may be possible to neglect the fluctuating environmental effects in situations where common cause failures occur", yet, "this may apply only in certain cases and is not a blanket statement." Would the authors care to elaborate on the constraints that limit the statement and on the circumstances under which it does not apply? Judging from Figure 11 (to which no reference is made in the text) one case to be treated' with caution is where Xcav < Xav, a rather evident observation.
Another comment concerns the representation of line terminals and the possibility of faults in the stations appearing as common-mode line failures when in fact they may not have such an effect. This would occur if each station was represented in the model by a single bus to which all lines emanating from the station are connected. The resulting error can, however, be avoided if, instead of using such buses in the model, the line failure rates are modified to take on the form a + bX, where X is the per km rate of line failures, b is the line length, and a is the rate at which line failures originate in the stations at the ends of a given line. The same modification is probably necessary for the common-mode line failure rates. It should not be too difficult to adjust data collecting schemes to provide the necessary information. Figures 3, 4 , 6, and 7, the common mode failures have the property that multiple component failures occur in (t, t + At). That is, whereas the probability of independent failures of the two components in (t, t + At) is considered negligible, in the common mode the components fail simultaneously. This does not pose any problem for modeling so long as the rates for independent and common mode failures are known. For data collection and failure rate estimation, however, confusion can arise. As an example, due to two lightning strikes, two lines may be knocked out, say 15 seconds apart. Theoretically, these two failures are independent but for the purposes of data collection,, it may be difficult to identify whether these failures are independent or common mode. In fact, it is due to such anomalies that there is such a diversity in the definition of common mode failures [1] . It Fig. 4 and 7 appear more appropriate since they distinguish the failed states due to common mode and independent failures. In the end, I would again like to compliment the authors for this excellent paper. 3909wealth Edison Company, Chicago, IL): The authors are to be complimented in highlighting the need for distinguishing states of the system by both the weather conditions and the set of equipment outages existing.
Recognizing only two weather states is at best an expedient simplification, since adverse weather may be characterized by any of several conditions (lightning, wind speed, temperature, and precipitation), each of which is of continuously variable intensity and having different effects on outage and repair rates.
While multiple weather state models may be valid for phenomena such as ice storms whose intensity varies gradually between points in the system, we do not feel that failure bunching adequately explains multiple outages occurring during major storms, such as tornados, where neither the stress at any single time nor the maximum stress observed is uniform over the entire system. Such weather is highly localized, and two lines which are both in the storm area have an important property in common -a common mode -which they do not share with lines outside the storm area. That is, the storm environment. We interpret that the authors' representation of the weather as either normal or adverse is intended to apply to all lines studied.
Thus, even if models distinguishing weather states are used, we feel there is an important place for common mnode outages of lines, regardless of other commnon physical exposures, which are in a common storm environment not experienced throughout the system. While in principle a weather state representing such storm conditions could be described, we feel it will be impossible to quantify exposure of a line to such conditions, due to their localized nature and short duration. Furthennore, the outage rates during such conditions will be extremely high, and the conditional probability of outage given such exposure will approach unity. Thus the frequency of joint outages of two lines will be essentially the frequency of storms affecting both of them, which can be considered a component of the common-mode outage rate.
The authors conclude that "it may be possible to neglect the fluctuating environment effects in situations where common cause failures occur. ..". We feel that environmental effects will be too important to neglect in any study of a larger network for which the rate of common mode outage of all the lines studied is very low and bunching of several independent outage events, each involving a subset of the lines under study, is the dominant mode of failure.
In summary, we agree with the authors' basic premise that weather is a significant factor to be recognized in modeling. We assert that there is an important class of common mode outages in which a localized storm environment is the important feature in common. We feel empirical tests are needed to evaluate the importance of separate normal and adverse weather states in predicting multiple outages.
Manuscript received March 9, 1981.
R. Billinton and Y. Kumar: The authors would like to thank all the discussors for their comments and for the interest shown in this paper. Dr. Sahu correctly notes that the collection of weather related data can prove difficult in many cases. This difficulty cannot, however, be completely overcome by segregating the data on a seasonal basis. This may partially solve the problem if there are some reasons in which adverse weather occurs infrequently and an average failure rate value is reasonably representative. If this is the case then it is also quite likely that there are other periods which have a marked difference in the normal and adverse weather failure rates and adverse weather occurs quite frequently i.e. snow and ice storm seasons. In these cases, the use of an overall average failure rate value will give quite optimistic results. Dr. Endrenyi notes an important point which we believe is worthy of further elaboration. In general it appears that if common cause failures can occur it is possible to neglect the fluctuating environment effects with negligible error in the calculated indices. It can be seen from Figure 11 that this will depend on the relative magnitudes of the common mode and independent outage failure rates. Initial data obtained from 3910 Ontario Hydro seems to indicate that this is a very reasonable assumption. We added the qualifier however that this may apply only in certain cases because the data should be looked at first following which the assumption may be made rather than making it automatically without examining the data. Dr. Endrenyi correctly notes how independent failures in the system equipment can be added to the line component using an equation a + bX. This is the standard approach and can be done easily provided that the station failures are independent events which impact only on the line in question. It is a major oversimplification to say that "the same modification is probably necessary for the common mode line failure rates." This can be done but will require a detailed analysis of the terminal station and its breaker configuration, protection and operating philosophy. An active failure of an element might be a common cause event for two lines on the same tower. It may also be a common cause event for two lines leaving the same bus but going to two quite different buses.
Dr. Singh notes an apparent way to ease the difficulty associated with segregating common mode failures during adverse weather from multiple independent adverse weather failures. This approach has been suggested by a number of people concerned with practical data collection. It has a certain intuitive appeal as it avoids the difficulty of having to comprehend the actual failure mechanism. This is basically a bad practice and will not lead to an understanding of transmission line failures even if it will simplify data collection. It will also require an attendant group of assumptions i.e. What is the maximum allowable time between two independent outages in order that they can be called a common mode event for the purpose of data collection? It may also hide dependent outages i.e. the loss of one line due to the failure of an adjacent line. This is a question of system proteciton and operating philosophy and should not be considered as a common mode outage. Dr. Singh's comment regarding Figure 10 is correct when the approximate equations are used. The Error Factor shown in Figure 10 To Failure is virtually negligible in the case shown in the paper and this is particularly true if the configuration is dominated by common cause failure and repair. The difference is also dependent upon the conditions upon which the system is considered to be available for service and therefore available for failure. The frequency balance approach can be used to find the equivalent transition rate provided that the state probabilities have first been determined. (Reference 1 of the paper). The common mode failure definition used in the paper is that quoted at the beginning of the paper and proposed by the Working Group on Common Mode Outages of the IEEE Application of Probability Methods Subcommittee. Dr. Singh correctly assesses the difficulty of selecting appropriate data and models to include the repair activity associated with independent and common mode outage events. Available utility data indicates that this is an area which will require considerable attention. These activities have minimal effect on the configuration failure rate but they have a considerable effect on the outage state probability and therefore potentially a significant effect on calculated bus indices for composite system reliability.
We appreciate the comments by Mr. Landgren and his associates and agree that the recognition of only two weather states is an approximation of what is in reality a multi-state situation. It is possible to model multi-states, but appears to be virtually impossible to obtain the data required to support these models.
We do not agree, however, that the presence of a storm constitutes in itself a "common mode". It provides a common environment in which both independent and common mode outages can occur. If the physical event such as a tornado provides a common mode outage then that is what it is. All multiple outages during a storm should not, however, be automatically classed as common mode outages because of the common environment within which they occurred.
In conclusion we would like to thank all the discussors for their valuable comments and for their interest in this important area.
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